

**In the United States Court of Federal Claims**  
**OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS**  
**No. 20-2048V**

MARGIE S. KEELING,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND  
HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent.

Chief Special Master Corcoran

Filed: August 15, 2023

*Amy A. Senerth, Muller Brazil, LLP, Dresher, PA, for Petitioner.*

*Mallori Browne Openchowski, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.*

**DECISION ON ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS<sup>1</sup>**

On December 30, 2020, Margie S. Keeling ("Petitioner") filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, *et seq.*<sup>2</sup> (the "Vaccine Act"). Petitioner alleged that as a result of an influenza vaccine received on October 17, 2019, she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration ("SIRVA") as defined on the Vaccine Injury Table. Petition at 1.

On May 12, 2022, Petitioner was ordered to show cause why her case should not be dismissed for failure to establish the severity requirement. She was again specifically

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<sup>1</sup> Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc>, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). **This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet.** In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.

<sup>2</sup> National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa.

directed to file any outstanding medical records and/or supplemental affidavits regarding the prescription medications, in addition to briefing the issue. Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 28) (setting Petitioner's original deadline as July 11, 2022); *see also* Petitioner's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time until August 10, 2022 (ECF No. 29), granted that same day by Order (Non-PDF).

On August 10, 2022, Petitioner filed a Motion for a Ruling on the Record focused on the severity issue. Motion (ECF No. 30). Petitioner did not, however, submit any additional evidence as suggested by the previous Order to Show Cause. On September 9, 2022, Respondent responded that the evidence still did not support a factual determination of severity in Petitioner's favor. Response (ECF No. 31). After consideration of both sides' arguments, I issued a Decision dismissing Petitioner's claim. ECF No. 32. Judgment entered on November 29, 2022. ECF No. 34. Following my determination, Petitioner elected to reject the Judgment and to file a civil action pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Vaccine Act.

On January 31, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion seeking a total of \$19,369.83 in attorney's fees and costs (representing \$18,492.50 in fees, and \$877.33 in costs). Petitioner's Application for Attorneys' Fees, ECF No. 36. In accordance with General Order No. 9, counsel for Petitioner represents that Petitioner incurred no out-of-pocket expenses. *Id.* at 2. Respondent subsequently reacted to the motion, indicating that he is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys' fees and costs are met in this case but deferring resolution of the amount to be awarded to my discretion. ECF No. 37.

For the reasons discussed below, I find there was a reasonable basis for Petitioner's claim, and she is otherwise entitled to a fees award despite the dismissal of her claim.

## **I. Reasonable Basis**

### **A. Legal Standard**

Motivated by a desire to ensure that petitioners have adequate assistance from counsel when pursuing their claims, Congress determined that fees and costs may be awarded even in unsuccessful Vaccine Program claims. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 22 *reprinted in* 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6363; *see also Sebelius v. Cloer*, 133 S.Ct. 1886, 1895 (2013) (discussing this goal when determining that attorneys' fees and costs may be awarded even when the petition was untimely filed); *Davis v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 105 Fed. Cl. 627, 634 (2012) ("the Vaccine Program employs a liberal fee-shifting

scheme”). The Act may, in fact, contain the only federal fees provisions expressly permitting unsuccessful litigants to recover fees and costs.

However, Congress did not intend that every losing petition be automatically entitled to attorney’s fees. *Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 33 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1994). And there is also a prerequisite to even obtaining fees in an unsuccessful case. The special master or court may permit attorney’s fees and costs in a case in which compensation was not awarded only if “that the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” Section 15(e)(1). Reasonable basis is a prerequisite to a fee award for unsuccessful cases – but establishing it does not automatically *require* an award, as special masters are still empowered by the Act to deny or limit fees. *James-Cornelius on behalf of E. J. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 984 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“even when these two requirements are satisfied, a special master retains discretion to grant or deny attorneys’ fees”).

As the Federal Circuit has explained, whether a discretionary fees award is appropriate involves two distinct inquiries – a subjective one when assessing whether the petition was brought in good faith and an objective one when ascertaining whether reasonable basis existed. *Simmons v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 875 F.3d 632, 635 (quoting *Chuisano v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 289 (2014)). “Good faith is a subjective test, satisfied through subjective evidence.” *Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 971 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“*Cottingham I*”). “[T]he ‘good faith’ requirement . . . focuses upon whether petitioner honestly believed he had a legitimate claim for compensation.” *Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, No. 99-0544V, 2007 WL 4410030, at \*5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007).

Cases in which good faith has been found to be lacking often involve petitioners who failed to produce or actively concealed evidence undermining their claims. *Purnell-Reid v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, No. 18-1101V, 2020 WL 2203712 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 6, 2020); *Crowding v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, No. 16-0876V, 2019 WL 1332797 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 26, 2019); *Heath v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, No. 08-0086V, 2011 WL 4433646 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 25, 2011); *Carter v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, No. 90-3659V, 1996 WL 402033 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 3, 1996).

“Additionally, a petitioner’s attorney’s conduct may also be relevant when evaluating good faith.” *Purnell-Reid*, 2020 WL 2203712, at \*6. “Counsel still have a duty to investigate a Program claim even if they reasonably find their client to be a credible individual.” *Cortez v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, No. 09-0176V, 2014 WL 1604002, at \*8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 26, 2014). Factors, such as a looming statute of limitations

and the conduct of counsel, are properly considered when determining whether good faith exists – but *do not bear* on the claim’s objective basis. *Simmons*, 875 F.3d at 636; *Amankwaa v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 138 Fed. Cl. 282, 289 (2018) (“the effort that an attorney makes to investigate a claim or to ensure that a claim is asserted before the expiration of the statutory limitations period . . . are properly evaluated in determining whether a petition was brought in good faith”).

“Reasonable basis, on the other hand, is an objective test, satisfied through objective evidence.” *Cottingham I*, 971 F.3d at 1344. The reasonable basis requirement examines “not at the likelihood of success [of a claim] but more to the feasibility of the claim.” *Turner*, 2007 WL 4410030, at \*6 (quoting *Di Roma v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, No. 90-3277V, 1993 WL 496981, at \*1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 18, 1993)). The Federal Circuit recently explained “that a reasonable basis analysis is limited to objective evidence, and that subjective considerations, such as counsel’s subjective views on the adequacy of a complaint, do not factor into a reasonable basis determination.” *James-Cornelius*, 984 F.3d at 1379.

Although clearly easier to meet than the preponderant standard required for compensation, “courts have struggled with the nature and quantum of evidence necessary to establish a reasonable basis.” *Wirtshafter v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 155 Fed. Cl. 665, 671 (Fed. Cl. 2021). “[I]t is generally accepted that ‘a petitioner must furnish *some evidence* in support of the claim.’” *Id.* (quoting *Chuisano*, 116 Fed. Cl. at 288, emphasis added in *Wirtshafter*). Citing the *prima facie* elements of a successful claim described in Section 11(c)(1), the Federal Circuit recently instructed that the level of the objective evidence sufficient for a special master to find reasonable basis should be “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of proof.” *Cottingham I*, 971 F.3d at 1345-46. “This formulation does not appear to define reasonable basis so much as set its outer bounds.” *Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 159 Fed. Cl. 328, 333, (Fed. Cl. 2022) (“*Cottingham II*”). “[T]he Federal Circuit’s statement that a special master ‘could’ find reasonable basis based upon more than a mere scintilla does not mandate such a finding.” *Cottingham II*, 159 Fed. Cl. at 333 (citing *Cottingham I*, 971 F.3d at 1346).

Furthermore, the issue of reasonable basis is not a static inquiry. The reasonable basis which existed when a claim was filed may cease to exist as further evidence is presented. *Perreira*, 33 F.3d at 1377. In *Perreira*, the Federal Circuit affirmed a special master’s determination that reasonable basis was lost after Petitioner’s “expert opinion, which formed the basis of the claim, was found to be unsupported by either medical literature or studies.” *Id.* at 1376.

## **B. Existence of Reasonable Basis**

I previously determined that Petitioner presented insufficient proof that the claimed injury was sufficiently severe to meet the Act's requirements. ECF No. 32. While Petitioner may in fact have experienced a SIRVA, it was fortunately a less serious injury that was improving over time, and did not necessarily require formal medical treatment to resolve. *See Keeling v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, No. 20-2048V, Slip Op. 32, (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 19, 2022).

Although not sufficient for entitlement, I find the minimal evidence Petitioner provided constitutes the level of proof required to establish reasonable basis – a standard far lower than the preponderance of evidence standard needed to meet the Vaccine Act's requirements for compensation. The fact of vaccination, and the SIRVA-like nature of Petitioner's injury were all substantiated by objective proof. And to the extent reasonable basis for the claim later ceased to exist, this only occurred *after* I dismissed her claim. Thus, since there is no other basis for a denial of fees, despite the claim's lack of success, a fees and costs award is appropriate.

## **II. Appropriate Amount to be Awarded**

### **A. Legal Standard**

Counsel must submit fee requests that include contemporaneous and specific billing records indicating the service performed, the number of hours expended on the service, and the name of the person performing the service. *See Savin v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316-18 (2008). Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." *Saxton v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). It is "well within the special master's discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work done." *Id.* at 1522. Furthermore, the special master may reduce a fee request *sua sponte*, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing a petitioner notice and opportunity to respond. *See Sabella v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009). A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner's fee application when reducing fees. *Broekelschen v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (2011).

### **B. Attorney's Fees and Costs**

I have reviewed the billing records submitted with Petitioner's request. In my experience, the request appears reasonable, and I find no cause to reduce the requested hours or rates. Petitioner billed a reasonable amount of time, using hourly rates previously

approved for all attorneys and paralegals performing work in this matter. Attachment to Motion at 5-12. Costs incurred were also reasonable, and should be awarded.

### **Conclusion**

I have determined that an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs is appropriate in this case, even though compensation was not awarded. Section 15(e)(1). I hereby GRANT Petitioner's Motion for attorney's fees and costs and award a total of **\$19,369.83** (representing \$18,492.50 in fees and \$877.33 in costs) as a lump sum in the form of a check jointly payable to Petitioner and her counsel, Amy A. Senerth.

In the absence of a timely-filed motion for review (see Appendix B to the Rules of the Court), the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this Decision.<sup>3</sup>

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

**s/Brian H. Corcoran**

Brian H. Corcoran  
Chief Special Master

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<sup>3</sup> Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint notice renouncing their right to seek review.